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  The ongoing process of global integration has intensified since the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995.  The 
WTO principles and declarations (for example the declaration by the WTO 
Ministers meeting in Singapore in December 1996) place a lot of emphasis on 
member countries commitments: to create and maintain a rule-based system 
that is fair, equitable, open and that promotes trade without discriminatory 
treatment and maintain and ensure highest degrees of transparency; to 
liberalize  trade and remove tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as other 
forms of protectionism from trade in goods and services; and to integrate 
developing, least-developed and countries in transition into the multilateral 
system and encourage further development and reforms. 
 
  While most countries (those that are already members of the WTO and 
those that are considering membership) are in the process of implementing 
the obligations associated with WTO principles, most countries in the 
Mediterranean region have gone an extra step by either having signed an 
individual agreement with the European Union (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan 
and the Palestinian Authority) or be in the process of reaching and agreement 
with the EU (Lebanon and Egypt) or having started negotiations (Algeria) or 
starting to discuss the idea (Syria).  The countries involved in these 
agreements commit to the implementation of obligations that are considered 
to be deeper than those of the WTO and are, therefore, expected to have 
significant impacts on these countries as well as other countries in the region 
(Organization of the Islamic Conference members make-up the majority of 
the countries expected to be directly affected).  According to Hoekman and 
Djankov (1996) the commitments of the Mediterranean partners to these 
Euro-Med agreements include implementing obligations associated with the 
following six elements: (1) political dialogue; (2) free movement of goods; 
(3) right of establishment  and supply of services; (4) payments, capital, 
competition and other safeguards; (5) economic, social and cultural 
cooperation; and (6) financial cooperation.  
  Various aspects of the Euro-Med partnerships have been discussed by 
many authors.  Hoekman and Djankov (1996) and Laanatza (1997) provide 
in-depth analysis and evaluation of these agreements.  They reach a number 
of interesting conclusions and provide many useful insights.  We highlight the 
conclusions relevant to our main objective of assessing the impacts of the 
agreements on countries of the OIC region.   Two of the conclusions reached 
by Hoekman and Djankov are that in the long run the Euro-Med agreements 
are expected to be beneficial to all partners involved, and that in the short run 
these agreements are likely to be economically welfare-reducing.  The first 
conclusion is supported by facts such as:  the trade liberalization required by 
the agreements is expected to improve productive capacity and efficiency; 
commitments by the partners to the agreements are likely to enhance the 
credibility of the reform paths pursued by the countries involved; and the 
agreements are likely to be very beneficial in inducing competition, 
encouraging investments and decreasing transaction costs associated with 
trade.  The second conclusion is supported by arguments such as:  the 
agreements are discriminatory by definition and may, therefore, involve 
significant trade-diversion; the transition path to free trade with the EU and 
the gradual liberalization of the economies involved are likely to take a long 
time due to the absence of binding commitments in foreign direct investment, 
services and government procurement and the broad safeguards; and the level 
of economic and financial cooperation between the partners and the degree of 
MFN tariffs (imposed on third countries) liberalization are critical factors in 
ensuring that the agreements are welfare improving. 
 
  Laanatza’s main conclusion is that given the formidable challenges 
associated with fulfilling the obligations of the Euro-Med agreements (and the 
WTO obligations as well) very significant restructuring of the Mediterranean 
economies is expected to take place.  Strong regional economic cooperation is 
needed to meet such challenges.  She suggests strongly that the agreements be 
reviewed completely so as to avoid hindering the development of intra 
regional trade (between the Mediterranean countries and with other countries 
in the region - e.g. OIC members).  To support her suggestion and conclusion she critically reviews the agreements with respect to the following elements:  
trade facilitation; product standards and certification systems; competition 
policy; government procurement; trade in services; intellectual property 
rights; foreign direct investment measures; market access conditions; rules of 
/origin; and subsidies within the EU.  She points out significant shortcomings 
with all the elements of the agreements.  We restate briefly two of her 
arguments and refer the reader to Laanatza (1997) for the rest.  Regarding 
rules of origin she notes that the current legal frameworks of the agreements 
work against the goal of creating a free-trade area in the region by 2010 since 
they do not allow countries that do not have similar rules of origin to 
conclude bilateral free trade agreements with each other.  Regarding EU 
policy for subsidies (which significantly supports the agricultural and 
industrial sectors), the inequality concerning access to funds (e.g. Spain is 
entitled to ten times the amount Morocco could receive over the next five 
years) is likely to favor EU firms over their Mediterranean counterparts in 
competition and to attract foreign investments into the EU through the “hub-
spoke” effect (i.e. investments that could have gone to one of the 
Mediterranean countries would instead go to the EU (the hub) and have 
access from there to all the Mediterranean partners (the spokes)). 
 
  It is with conclusions similar to the above that we embark in 
quantifying and assessing the impact of regional economic groupings, in 
particular the Euro-Med partnerships on the trade prospects of the OIC 
countries.  In order to do this we study the export potential of countries in the 
region by analyzing the similarity and correspondence of their exports and 
imports with the imports and exports of their alternative trading partners from 
the OIC and the EU regions.  The idea is simple:  we construct trade 
similarity indices (to be defined below) for the periods of the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s and for certain commodity groups and use them to analyze the 
export prospects of the countries in the OIC region and the expected impacts 
of the Euro-Med partnerships.  This is work in progress and due to time and 
data limitations we report here on the first  half of the project  where data for 
selected OIC members and selected industrial countries (including some of 
the EU members) from the period between 1982 to 1987 is used.  
  This study has two purposes.  One to understand the potential for 
bilateral trade between OIC member countries and their alternative trading 
partners and assess their export prospects.  The other is to analyze the impact 
of the formation of discriminatory trade liberalization on third partners.  The 
potential for trade between these countries and their trading partners is 
assessed taking into account the commodity composition of trade of the 
countries involved.  This is done  using a measure of the similarity between 
the export and import vectors of pairs of countries.  This would reveal both 
the export prospects of the countries and  whether formation of partnerships 
by some of the countries (or example with the European Union) are likely to 
help or harm trade between them and other countries (OIC members). 
 
 
The Potential for Trade 
 
  One formal way of assessing trade flows that have not yet taken place 
is by tests of correspondence between exports and imports of pairs of 
countries.  Given a vector of economy i’s exports and a vector of economy j’s 
imports, the greater is the similarity between the two vectors the greater is 
the potential for exports from country i to country j.  Using vector analysis, 
two vectors A and B are said to be similar the closer the value of the cosine 
of the angle between them is to 1.  The value of the cosine of the angle 
between two vectors is given by the scalar product of the two vectors divided 
by the product of their magnitudes.  That is,  
 
Cosa AB
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where A and B are the vectors and a is the angle between them.  Denoting the 
vector exports of country i by Xi and the vector of imports of country j by 
Mj, then similarity between the exports supply of country i and the imports 
demand of country j can be measured by the trade similarity index, TSij (= 
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TSij  is a measure of commodity correspondence in the trade structure of the 
two countries.  TSij = 0 implies that no trade will take place as the 
commodities of the exporting country do not correspond to the commodities 
of the importing country.  There is potential for trade when (0<TSij<1), 
with trade possibilities increasing as the value of TSij gets closer to 1.  TS is 
an ordinal measure ranking items within a given collection from highest to 
lowest without measuring their magnitudes.  In order to decide on what the 
magnitude of TS implies for the relationship, we will use the following   
standard rule of thumb:  TS values of 0.8 to 1.00 indicate very high 
similarity, values of 0.6 to 0.8 indicate high similarity, values between 0.4 
and 0.6 indicate moderate similarity, values between 0.2 and 0.4 indicate low 
similarity, and values between 0.0 and 0.2 indicate little if any similarity. 
 
  Some comments are in order.  This index was developed originally by 
Allen (1959), and has been used in a number of studies by Linnemann (see 
for example Linnemann (1966), Linnemann and van Beers (1988) and van 
Beers and Linnemann (1991)) and van Beers and Biessen (1995).  The export 
and import vectors at SITC-3 digit level were taken from the UN 
International Trade Statistics Yearbook for the 1986-87 period where 
available.  This index is based on total trade of the country to all destination 
and does not reflect (or use) actual bilateral trade.  It does, however, reflect 
the potential for bilateral trade flows between pairs of countries. 
 
  The TS values are calculated for a sample of 25 countries, with 5 
industrial countries (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) and 20 countries from the OIC region (including some of the Euro-
Med partners).   
 
  Table 1 gives the values of  the TS indices for the expected bilateral 
trade flows in three-digit commodity levels between the countries in the 
sample as well as the average values of the indices for trade with blocks of 
partners taken from the sample (the blocks are:  all countries in the sample, 
industrial countries and OIC members).  One general result that emerges 
from the table and confirms conventional wisdom is that, countries with 
large, developed and diversified export bases tend to have higher similarity 
between their exports and the imports of other countries when compared with 
non-diversified economies.  This result is evident by the higher TS measures 
of most industrial countries (as exporters) and the lower TS measures of other 
countries (as exporters).   
 
  Table 1 reveals that Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Oman and Indonesia (with 
indices bigger than 0.34) seem to have export vectors that correspond 
relatively better on average with the import vectors of other countries in the 
sample, compared with other OIC members in the sample.  While their TS 
measures indicate that their exports have low similarity on average with all 
countries in the sample, their potential is reasonable when we note that the 
values of most industrial countries in the sample fall in the 0.4 to 0.5 range.  
TS figures for the one and two digit commodity levels (not reported here) 
reveal better  correspondence among all countries in the sample.  Many of the 
OIC members have TS measures that fall below the 0.2 level for their export 
and their import vectors, at the three digit commodity level.  On the export 
side the countries with little or no similarity with the rest include Turkey, 
Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Somalia, Yemen and 
Sudan.  On the import side the list includes Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, 
Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan and Libya.  These OIC members 
seem to have exports and/or imports at the three digit-level that are 
concentrated in a few products, thus decreasing the likelihood of a good 
match with the import and/or export vectors of other countries.  TS figures 
for commodities at the one and two digit levels are much higher.  The import vectors of all countries in the sample corresponds relatively better with the 
export vectors of industrial countries, as stated in the last paragraph except 
for Bahrain, Syria, Turkey and Japan which seem to match better with 
members of the OIC. 
 
  The diagonal elements (TSii) of Table 1 reflect the possibilities for 
intra-industry trade (i.e. a country exporting and importing goods falling 
within the same product classification).  A high value for the index would 
indicate that the set of commodities produced and traded by the country give 
rise to product differentiation and situations where the country could export 
and import different varieties of the same good.  The TSii values for the 
Syria, Malaysia and UAE are high (within the 0.51-0.78 range), while the 
values for the rest of OIC members in the sample are substantially lower 
(below 0.2 for the majority).  This suggests that these countries have more 
possibilities, relative to the rest of the group, for intra-industry trade. 
 
    We now turn our attention to the countries of the Mediterranean 
region that have or are in their way to having free trade agreements with the 
European Union.  These countries are Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, 
Algeria and Syria. Table 1 reveals that while exports of this group match 
better on average  with imports of the industrial countries, Bahrain, Turkey, 
Jordan, Syria, Oman and to some extent Indonesia represent potentially good 
destinations for the exports of most members of the group.  Table 1 also 
shows that while import vectors of the group correspond better with the 
export vectors of  industrial countries, Tunisia, Oman, Libya, Indonesia, 
Egypt and to some extent UAE represent potentially good sources of imports 



























Notes:       - Data is for 1986 unless indicated otherwise  
       - Imports vector for Yemen was not available 
       - Exports vector for Bahrain and Qatar were not available 
 
Source: Calculated by author from trade data at the SITC 3-digit level in   
the 1990 UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook.  
 
  Using this information, revealed by Table 1 we conclude that free 
trade partnerships of each of the countries in the group with the EU are likely 
to be harmful to Indonesia, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey and to 
some extent Algeria, Oman, Libya and Egypt by attracting some of the 
beneficial trade that could take place with them to the EU.  This could happen 
also due to the fact that the limited absorptive capacity of foreign goods by 
the Mediterranean countries could lead to a situation where an increase in 
imports (say) from Germany (as a result of the partnership) leads to  a 
decrease in imports from (say) Indonesia even if the set of imports from 
Indonesia is different from the set of imports from Germany.  It is also likely 
that the partnerships would harm Tunisia, Syria and Egypt if the rules and 
obligations embodied in the agreements prevent them from forming 
preferential trading arrangements with other countries in the region. 
 
  The evidence, so far, suggests that industrial countries (including most 
EU members) are potentially the best trading partners for most OIC countries 
in the list.  Actual trade figures confirm this.  In the mid-eighties 
approximately 40% of Jordan’s imports came from Europe and approximately 
20% of its exports went to Europe, the figures were, respectively: 75% and 
75% for Tunisia and Algeria; 60% and 65% for Morocco; 55% and 50% for 
Egypt; and 50% and 70% for Syria.  While the Euro-Med partnerships are to 
create free trade areas within approximately ten years,  it is expected that 
trade in certain sectors (sensitive) would remain restricted.  Relatively little 
changes have taken place regarding market access of certain commodities 
(agricultural goods and clothing and textiles) from the partners to the EU.  
While the agreements involve fundamental changes regarding market access 
of EU exporters into the partners’ markets the opposite is not true, except 
may be for industrial goods.  In order to capture the effects of these and 
related restrictive aspects of the agreements we calculated trade similarity 
indices for sensitive and non-sensitive products for the group of 
Mediterranean partners.  The list of sensitive and non-sensitive goods, which follows similar work by Aggion et al (1992) and van Beers and Biessen 
(1995), is given in the Appendix. 
  Table 2 gives the TS values for the Mediterranean partners as 
exporters and importers respectively, with all countries in the sample, at  the 
three-digit commodity level for three categories: all goods, sensitive sectors 
and none-sensitive sectors.  While TS values are somewhat low for both 
exports and import in all categories, on average Syrian and Tunisian vectors 
match relatively better with the vectors of other countries in the sample.   
With respect to exports, however, Egyptian and Tunisian export vectors 
correspond relatively better to the import vectors of other countries in the 
sample in the all commodities and in the none-sensitive sectors, while 
Jordanian and Moroccan vectors have the better match in the sensitive sectors 
category.  On the import side, Jordanian and Syrian import vectors 
correspond better with the export vectors of other countries in the sample in 
the all commodities and the none-sensitive sectors, while Tunisian and 
Moroccan vectors match relatively better with others in the sensitive sectors.  Table 2: Trade Similarity Indices for Euro-Med Partners with all 
Countries in the Sample 
   Tables 3 and 4, which give Similarity indices for trade with the 
industrial countries and members of the OIC respectively, indicate that on 
average in all commodity categories Tunisia, Algeria and to some extent 
Egypt make relatively better trading partners with the industrial group of 
countries while Jordan, Tunisia and to some extent Syria and Egypt make 
better trading partners with countries of the OIC.  As for specific sectors, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Syria seem to have exports that match relatively 
better with the imports of the industrial and the OIC countries in both the all 
sectors combined and the none-sensitive sectors.  In the sensitive sectors 
Moroccan, Tunisian and Syrian exports match relatively better with the 
industrial countries while Jordanian exports match relatively better with the 
members of the OIC.  On the side of imports, the TS indices of all six 
countries with the industrial countries are very close in value ranging from 
0.31 to 0.55.  Syria, Jordan and Morocco seem to have the relatively better 
match of their imports with the exports of members of the OIC, especially in 
the all-goods and the none-sensitive-goods categories. 
  The proceeding analysis reveals that the export potential of the group 
in the sensitive sectors is relatively weaker than that of the none-sensitive 
sectors, except for Morocco and  Jordan.  This suggests that the restrictive 
policies of the EU are not likely to be more harmful to these countries in 
sensitive as compared with none-sensitive sectors.  The harm, however, could 
come from whether the rules and obligations embodied in the agreements 
would prevent the Mediterranean partners from taking advantage of export 
possibilities, that may have risen more recently.  In order to find the 
likelihood of that, one needs to analyze more recent evidence on trade 
potential and similarity.  This is forthcoming. Table 3: Trade Similarity Indices for Euro-Med Partners  
with Industrial Countries 
 Table 4: Trade Similarity Indices for Euro-Med Partners  
with Members of the OIC 
 
 Conclusions 
  Using a measure of commodity composition of trade,  that provides 
insights on the export potential of countries and the bilateral trade possibilities 
between them, it appears that the Euro-Med agreements are likely to have 
some negative impacts on some of the OIC members.  The analysis also 
suggests that in order to take advantage of export possibilities and realize 
export potential, for all countries involved, the agreements should be 
carefully reviewed.  This point is in agreements with what Laanatza (1997) 
suggested from her analysis of the contents of the agreements themselves.  
We should note, however, that while this work sheds some light onto the 
issue of the impact of the Euro-Med partnerships on OIC members, it is 
incomplete.  More recent evidence should be reviewed in order to build a 
stronger picture of the trade possibilities of countries in the region.  More 
decompositions of the data into various commodity groups are needed in 
order to make the effects more specific and the general picture more 
complete.  A number of authors have been studying the determinants of 
actual bilateral trade.  We are currently introducing the trade similarity index 
as an explanatory variable in such models.  The benefit of doing this, for our 
interests here, is to find whether countries, in the region, with export 
potential have been able to turn that potential into actual exports. References 
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